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Transboundary resource disputes are often 
analyzed by reference to two nebulous and conflicting 
principles that have emerged in international 
environmental law: “equitable and reasonable 
utilization” and “no significant harm.” Frequently 
overlooked in this context is the potential value of other 
canons of international law—especially human rights 
law, criminal law, and the rules governing the use of 
force—in adding definition to the muddled contours of 
these foundational precepts. This Article therefore 
undertakes an assessment of sovereign rights and 
obligations regarding shared natural resources which 
arise from these other bodies of law. In doing so, it 
offers new lenses through which to evaluate competing 
state resource claims. It also provides fresh perspective 
on longstanding controversies in international law 
relating to extraterritorial jurisdiction, conflict of 
rights, and non-military attacks or uses of force. 
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In April 2021, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan returned to the 
bargaining table for talks related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance 
Dam (“GERD”), the latest episode in a protracted negotiation that has 
stretched on for nearly a decade. After two days of meetings, the 
trilateral initiative sputtered and was followed by renewed appeals for 
international intervention.1 
 
*_ Eian Katz is a Legal and Policy Analyst at Canmore Company. He 
previously served as Counsel at Public International Law and Policy Group. He 
holds a JD from the University of Chicago and a BA from Yale University. 
1 Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia Talks Over Nile Dam Fail, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 
6, 2021), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/6/sudan-says-ethiopias-moves-
on-nile-dam-violate-international-law; Nile Dam Dispute Could be Heading to 













The GERD is a massive infrastructure project which, upon its 
expected completion in 2023, promises to more than double Ethiopia’s 
installed energy capacity in a country in which 65 million people lack 
electricity.2 In Ethiopia, the dam has been transformed into a national 
symbol, extolled in song by its most popular musical artist3 and in 
verse by its political leaders.4  
 
In downriver Egypt and Sudan, by contrast, the outlook is far 
dimmer. Egypt is particularly dependent upon the Nile—the river 
supplies 90% of its fresh water5 and 90% of all Egyptians call its valley 
home.6 Already facing a critical water shortage, Egypt believes that 
that damming the Nile will exacerbate this scarcity and endanger 
farmland that accounts for two-thirds of its food production.7 With 
these grim consequences portended, Cairo has characterized the 
GERD as an existential threat.8 Despite the stakes, ongoing efforts to 
resolve the controversy have repeatedly foundered. 
 
The Nile River is but one example of a resource shared by 
multiple sovereigns. Throughout the world, many rivers, lakes, 
aquifers, forests, fish and wildlife populations, and oil, gas, and 
mineral deposits—not to mention the air we breathe—traverse national 
borders. Interstate disagreements over the use of these resources is 
 
2 U.N. Sec, Council, Annex to the letter dated 14 May 2020 from the 
Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the 
President of the Security Council 6, 11, U.N. Doc. S/2020/409 (May 15, 2020). 
3 Teddy Afro: How Do We Negotiate over the Nile?, ETHIOPIAN MONITOR 
(Aug. 4, 2020), https://ethiopianmonitor.com/2020/08/04/teddy-afro-how-do-we-
negotiate-over-the-nile/. 
4 Max Bearak and Sudarsan Raghavan, Africa’s Largest Dam Powers 
Dreams of Prosperity in Ethiopia and Fears of Hunger in Egypt, WASH. POST (Oct. 
15, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2020/grand-
ethiopian-renaissance-dam-egypt-nile/. 
5 Egypt to Withdraw from Latest Nile Dam Talks for Consultations, AL 
JAZEERA (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/5/egypt-to-
withdraw-from-latest-nile-dam-talks-for-consultations. 
6 Magdi Abdelhadi, Nile Dam Row: Egypt Fumes as Ethiopia Celebrates, 
BBC (July 29, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53573154. 
7 Eric Knecht and Maha El Dahan, Egypt’s Rice Farmers See Rough 
Times Downstream of New Nile Mega-Dam, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-rice-insight-idUSKBN1HU1O0; Bearak 
and Raghavan, supra note 4. 
8 Egypt Warns of ‘Existential Threat’ from Ethiopia Dam, AL JAZEERA 
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commonplace; in recent decades, conflict has flared on the banks of 
the Indus, Mekong, and Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.9 Climate change 
only threatens to exacerbate scarcities and competition. 
 
The prominence and gravity of interstate resource disputes 
notwithstanding, the applicable law remains shrouded in 
indeterminacy. For more than a century, the Westphalian international 
system has struggled to accommodate a reality in which resource 
ownership can be collective rather than exclusive to the territorial 
sovereign. This effort has resulted in the development of two nebulous 
and sometimes-inconsistent principles in treaty and customary law. 
The first is the sovereign right of states to “equitable and reasonable 
utilization” (“ERU”) of transboundary resources. The second is a 
reciprocal obligation to cause “no significant harm” (“NSH”) to other 
states reliant upon the same resource. Lingering uncertainties as to the 
meaning of these terms and their interrelation has made law an 
inadequate tool in resolving disputes over shared natural resources. 
 
Much scholarship has been produced attempting to bring 
clarity to the hazy concepts of ERU and NSH. However, the literature 
has largely undertheorized the responsibilities of plural resource 
sovereigns that derive from other sources of public international law. 
Regardless of their compliance with ERU and NSH, states may not 
utilize resources in a manner that would violate their other 
international obligations. This Article suggests that transboundary 
resource utilization may in fact be limited by international human 
rights law, international criminal law, and the UN Charter’s general 
prohibition of the use of force. A fuller realization of these limitations 
may inform the understanding of ERU and NSH. 
 
At the same time, the transnational character of certain 
resources challenges bodies of law predicated on fixed state borders. 
This challenge mirrors that posed by other transboundary threats, like 
pollution and disease. For these branches of law to remain relevant in 
a changing threat environment, they must develop responses to these 
emerging issues. This Article therefore also explores where these 
responses are needed and what form they might take, with a focus on 
 
9 Noa Tann and Madeline Flamik, Interstate Dam Disputes Threaten 












extraterritorial jurisdiction, conflict of rights, and non-military or non-
kinetic attacks or uses of force. 
 
Part I reviews the origins and contested meanings of the two 
leading precepts governing the usage of shared natural resources: 
equitable and reasonable utilization and no significant harm. Part II 
then considers scenarios in which the misuse of transboundary 
resources may violate international human rights law, international 
criminal law, or the UN Charter’s presumptive ban on the use of force. 
Part III comments on the implications of this analysis for the 
management of shared resources and for the evolution of these 
corpuses of law. 
 
I. MURKY WATERS: UTILIZATION AND HARM 
 
 Much of international environmental law has been inspired by 
and shaped in response to “the impact that activities in one territory 
may have on the territory of another.”10 As the international 
community began to turn its attention to the particular issue of natural 
resources shared between two or more states, it coalesced early on 
around the idea that one state’s usage should not be to the detriment of 
another state.11 This basic notion derives from and is sometimes 
rendered as the Roman Law maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laedas, or “use your own property in such a way that you do not injure 
that of others.” During the 20th century, “no significant harm” (“NSH”) 
formed the underlying principle for a raft of subsequent agreements 
focusing on the conservation of the natural environment.12  
 
Along with the responsibility to do no significant harm, 
international law later came to recognize a corresponding right to 
development that includes “full permanent sovereignty… over all… 
 
10 Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren Rijn”) Ry. (Belgium v. Netherlands), 27 R.I.A.A. 
35, para. 222 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/477. 
11 INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 
REGARDING THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES FOR PURPOSES OTHER 
THAN NAVIGATION—DECLARATION OF MADRID 365 (Apr. 20, 1911). 
12 See, e.g.  U.N. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/164/37, art. 7 (Sept. 8, 1995); 
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, art. 5 
(June 23, 1979); Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as 
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natural resources.”13 The principle of “equitable and reasonable 
utilization” (“ERU”) was conceived as a means to reconcile the 
apparent conflict between sovereign rights and sovereign duties 
respecting resources shared among multiple states. Yet NSH and ERU 
remain somewhat muddled both in their individual meanings and in 
their interaction. This Part briefly summarizes the origins of each and 
the enduring tensions and ambiguities. 
 
A. No Significant Harm 
 
The common law principle of sic utere tuo has been applied 
extensively in environmental law.14 In several treaties, it is framed as 
an absolute duty not to “cause damage to the environment of other 
states” from activity originating within a state’s jurisdiction or 
control.15 In more recent sources, this has been softened to an 
obligation not to cause “significant harm,” and to mitigate such harm 
once inflicted.16 A “significant harm” is one that is more than merely 
“detectable,” but less intense than a “serious” or “substantial” harm.17 
 
When there is a violation of the NSH mandate, relevant treaties 
and draft conventions impose liability upon states in accordance with 
 
13 See G. A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States, art. 2 (Dec. 12, 1974); see also G. A. Res. 41/128, Declaration on the Right 
to Development, art. 1 (Dec. 4, 1986).  
14 T.R. Subramanya and Shuvro Prosun Sarker, Emergence of Principle of 
Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non-Laedes in Environmental Law and Its Endorsement 
by International and National Courts: An Assessment, 5 KATHMANDU L. REV. 1, 
5–8 (2017). 
15 G. A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States, art. 30 (Dec. 12, 1974); UN Environment Programme, Draft Principles in 
the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and 
Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, U.N. 
Doc. UNEP/GC.6/CRP.2, principle 3.1 (May 19, 1978); Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26, principle 2 (Aug. 12, 
1992). 
16 See Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, art. 7 (May 21, 1997); Draft Articles on the Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers, with Commentaries, art. 6, ILC 60th Sess. (2008); see also 
International Law Commission, Protection of the Atmosphere: Texts and Titles of 
Draft Guidelines and Preamble Adopted by the Drafting Committee on First 
Reading, guideline 3, 70th Sess. (June 6 2018). 
17 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary 










applicable international law.18 The pertinent customary rules are 
compiled in the International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) Draft 
Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities, which concern “activities not prohibited by international 
law which involve a risk of causing significant transboundary harm 
through their physical consequences.”19 The draft articles describe the 
subject risk threshold as “a high probability of causing significant 
transboundary harm and a low probability of causing disastrous 
transboundary harm.”20 States must take “all appropriate measures” to 
minimize such risks.21 According to a complementary set of ILC draft 
principles, when damage is caused by hazardous activities the 
responsible state must provide “prompt and adequate compensation to 
victims.”22 
 
B. Equitable and Reasonable Utilization 
 
One of the earliest expressions of what would become the ERU 
principle appears in the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States: “In the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or 
more countries, each State must co-operate… in order to achieve 
optimum use of such resources without causing damage to the 
legitimate interest of others.”23 In draft principles produced by the UN 
Environment Programme (“UNEP”) a few years later, this language is 
updated to require interstate cooperation “consistent with the concept 
of equitable utilization of shared natural resources.”24 In various 
sources, ERU has also been alternately stylized as “optimum” or 
“sustainable” utilization.25 
 
The concept of ERU has been adopted in treaty instruments for 
many different applications. Certain regional agreements concerning 
 
18 G. A. Dec. UNEP/GC.6/CRP.2, principle 12.1 (May 19, 1978); Int’l 
Law Comm’n, supra note 17, at 42. 
19 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary 
Harm from Hazardous Activities, with Commentaries, art. 1, 53rd Sess. (2001). 
20 Id. art. 2(a). 
21 Id. art. 3. 
22 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the 
Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities, with 
Commentaries, U.N. Doc A/61/10, at principle 4, 58th Sess. (2006). 
23 G. A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), at 3, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States (Dec. 12, 1974). 
24 G. A. Dec. 3129, supra note 18 (principle 1).  
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shared resources, such as the Amazon rainforest or the Colorado, Rio 
Grande, and Tijuana rivers, mandate a “rational utilization” or an 
“equitable distribution” of waters among state parties.26 The UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) charges coastal states 
with promoting the “optimum utilization” of living resources within 
the exclusive economic zones surrounding their shores.27 ERU has also 
been incorporated into treaties and draft conventions governing the 
global usage of specific types of resources, such as migratory fish,28 
transnational waterways,29 drainage basins,30 aquifers,31 and the 
atmosphere.32 
 
The fullest articulation of ERU is given in the Convention on 
the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
(“UNWC”), which entered into force in 2014. “Equitable and 
reasonable utilization” is described there as fostering the upstream 
watercourse state’s “optimal and sustainable utilization…, taking into 
account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent 
with the adequate protection of the watercourse.”33 This 
characterization illustrates that ERU contains both a right to make 
productive use of the resource and a restraint on that right. The UNWC 
drafters explain that “equitable” does not necessarily mean 
quantitatively equal proportions, but rather qualitatively equal rights 
 
26 Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, art. 5, July 3, 1978, 1202 U.N.T.S. 
19194; Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio 
Grande, art. 16, Mex.-U.S., Feb 3, 1944, T.S. No. 994.  
27 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 62, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
28 U. N. Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks, Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/164/37, preamble & art. 5 (Sept. 8, 1995) (calling 
on parties to achieve “optimum utilization” and to avoid “overutilization”). 
29, Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, art. 5, May 21, 1997, G.A. Res. 51/229 [hereinafter International 
Watercourses]. 
30 Int’l Law Comm’n, The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of 
International Rivers, arts. 4 &5 (Aug. 1996) [hereinafter The Helsinki Rules]. 
31 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary 
Aquifers, with Commentaries, art. 4, 60th Sess. (2008). 
32 Int’l Law Comm’n, Protection of the Atmosphere: Texts and Titles of 
Draft Guidelines and Preamble Adopted by the Drafting Committee on First 
Reading, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at guideline 6, (2018).  










in consideration of each interested state’s circumstances.34 
“Reasonable,” in turn, requires taking measures to maximize the 
benefits accruing to all states.35  
 
The UNWC and other sources set forth a non-exhaustive set of 
factors bearing on the equity and reasonableness of utilization, 
including a) geographic, climatic, and ecological considerations, b) 
social and economic needs, c) dependent populations, d) downstream 
effects, e) existing and potential uses, f) conservation and 
development, and g) alternative uses.36 These factors are to be 
weighted according to their relative importance under the 
circumstances, allowing for flexibility in application.37 
 
C. Tensions and Ambiguities 
 
Despite this evaluative guidance, the contours of the ERU 
principle remain contested and poorly defined in international law. 
Textual sources provide little instruction as to the application of the 
multi-factor test when a conflict of uses arises. Treaty and customary 
law dictate that the relative weights are to be assigned case by case, 
with special regard for “vital human needs.”38 But without clearer 
guidance as to their prioritization, these criteria have been described 
as of “limited utility” in practice.39 Vagueness as to the substance of 
ERU has led to disagreements between resource-sharing states, “while 
not providing any tools for resolving [them].”40 
 
34 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses and Commentaries Thereto and Resolution on 
Transboundary Confined Groundwater, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.492, Corr.1, Corr.2, 
Corr.3 and Add.1 at 98 (1994) [hereinafter Draft Articles on the Law of Non-
Navigational Uses]. 
35 Id. at 97.  
36 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, art. 6 (May 21, 1997), U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229. See also Int’l Law 
Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, with 
Commentaries, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/63/10 at 22, (2008); The Helsinki Rules, supra 
note 30, at art. 5. 
37 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, art. 6 (May 21, 1997), U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229. 
38 International Watercourses, art. 10, supra note 29. 
39 Bruce Lankford, Does Article 6 (Factors Relevant to Equitable and 
Reasonable Utilization) in the UN Watercourses Convention Misdirect Riparian 
Countries?, 38 WATER INT’L 130, 130 (2013). 
40 Itay Fischhendler, Ambiguity in Transboundary Environmental Dispute 
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Further ambiguity clouds ERU’s relational status in respect to 
NSH. The inherent tension between these principles figures 
prominently in resource disputes, with states undertaking development 
projects appealing to the ERU as a reasonableness standard while 
impacted neighboring states champion NSH as a rule of strict 
liability.41 Historically, sic utere predominated, with the concept of 
ERU only developing in the mid-20th century.42 Many treaties still give 
preference to existing uses, thereby acting to preserve the status quo.43 
More recently, however, ERU has overtaken NSH in precedence by 
most estimations, labeled as the “guiding criterion” by the drafters of 
the UNWC.44 The UNWC consequently prescribes a balancing of 
interests in which the harm caused is one factor among many.45 To 
accommodate this reordering, “harm” has been reinterpreted as “legal 
harm” rather than “factual harm.”46  
 
International courts and tribunals have also wrestled with the 
contradiction to little avail. In the International Court of Justice’s 
(“ICJ”) 1997 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, it trumpeted ERU to the 
diminution of the no-harm principle.47 However, in its 2010 Pulp Mills 
decision, the Court leaned heavily on sic utere.48 With no judicial or 
scholarly consensus emerging, the interplay between the two 
principles remains “uncertain and confused” and “susceptible to 
contradictory interpretations.”49 As a result, lack of clarity as to how 
ERU and NSH assign property rights in natural resources has been at 
the heart of the legal dispute over the GERD.50 
 
41 Sharmila L. Murthy and Fatima Mendikulova, Water, Conflict, and 
Cooperation in Central Asia: The Role of International Law and Deiplomacy, 18 
VT. J. ENVTL. L. 400, 411–12 (2017). 
42 Tamar Meshel, Swimming Against the Current: Revisiting Principles of 
International Water Law in the Resolution of Fresh Water Disputes, 61 HARV. 
INT’L L. REV. 135, 152–54 (2020). 
43 Murthy and Mendikulova, supra note 41, at 411. 
44 Draft Articles on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses, supra note 34, at 
103.  
45 Id. 
46 Meshel, supra note 42, at 154-57. 
47 Id. at 157 (citing Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 
1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25)). 
48 Id. at 157–58 (citing Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Argentina v. 
Uruguay), 2010 I.C.J. 14, paras. 175, 177 (Apr. 20)). 
49 Id. at 141. 
50 Rawia Tawfik & Ines Dombrowsky, GERD and Hydropolitics in the 











II. FURTHER SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
 ERU and NSH might be said together to comprise a lex 
specialis governing the usage of shared natural resources. But they are 
not the only relevant sources of public international law. International 
human rights commitments apply extraterritorially under 
circumstances that might be met by control over shared resources. 
Certain international crimes may be committed by depriving 
populations of vital resources. And action that results in an acute 
resource shortage might be considered a use of force or an armed 
attack for purposes of the UN Charter. This Part therefore considers 
whether the mismanagement of shared natural resources might 
constitute a breach of international obligations apart from ERU and 
NSH. 
 
A. International Human Rights Law 
 
 Human rights law typically protects individuals and 
communities from abuses committed by their own governments. 
Under certain circumstances, however, states may owe human rights 
obligations to populations outside of their territory. In fact, with the 
possible exception of the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”),51 the texts of human rights treaties rarely 
explicitly confine themselves to the territorial boundaries of state 
parties, but instead apply throughout the state’s jurisdiction.52 
Jurisdiction may at times be extraterritorial, especially when a state 
exercises some form of control over persons or property abroad or is 
 
Alistair Rieu-Clarke, and Zeray Yihdego, eds., THE GRAND ETHIOPIAN 
RENAISSANCE DAM AND THE NILE BASIN: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSBOUNDARY 
WATER COOPERATION (Routledge ed., 2018). 
51 See Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign 
Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age, 56 HARVARD INTL. L. J. 81, 108–11 
(2015) (The ICCPR obligates state parties “to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in 
the [ ] Convention.” International covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 2(1). Notwithstanding the usage of the term 
“territory,” some scholars have suggested that this article yet admits of 
extraterritorial application.); see also THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, TO RESPECT AND TO 
ENSURE: STATE OBLIGATIONS AND PERMISSIBLE DEROGATIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL 
BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (Louis 
Henkin, ed. 1981). 
52 MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN 
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otherwise in a position to influence the rights of non-citizens. States 
sharing resources might attain to this level of control over the rights 
potentialities of their neighbors. Specifically, one state’s utilization of 
a shared resource has the potential to profoundly impact the human 
rights to food, water, health, and life in other states reliant upon the 
same resource.  
 
This section presents four models representing the judicial and 
scholarly treatment of the extraterritorial application of human rights 
obligations and assesses their consequences for states sharing natural 
resources. The first two models—effective control and personal 
jurisdiction—do not seem like they would impose additional human 
rights obligations upon states sharing natural resources, at least in their 
current forms. On the other hand, the latter two approaches—negative 
rights and functionalism—do lead to the application of extraterritorial 
human rights law to transboundary resources. 
 
1. Effective Control 
 
 According to one strand of jurisprudence, espoused in the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) and the ICJ,53 
human rights treaties apply in areas where state parties exercise 
effective control, even if outside of national territory. The paradigmatic 
example is a military occupation, though the standard for effective 
control is not necessarily coterminous with the meaning of occupation 
as codified in international humanitarian law.54 The threshold for 
effective control is set relatively high, though still lower than the level 
applicable within the state’s own territory and not necessarily 
exclusive.55 In several cases examining whether or not a foreign state 
had exerted effective control, the outcome has turned on whether it 




53 Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, Judgment, para. 62 (Feb. 23, 
1995); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, paras. 109–13 (July 9, 2004); Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, paras. 179, 
216–17 (Dec. 19, 2005). 
54 MILANOVIC, supra note 52, at 141–47. 
55 Id. at 140–41, 147–51. 
56 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, Judgment, para. 135, 
149 (July 7, 2011); Al-Saadoon v. Secretary of State for Defence, England and 










 States sharing resources may command a considerable level of 
control over the destinies of their neighbors. The construction of the 
GERD, for example, may have catastrophic human rights 
consequences in other riparian states. Recognizing this interrelation, 
treaties governing the usage of transboundary resources often regulate 
activities within a state party’s “jurisdiction or control” rather than 
activities within its territory alone.57 In this context, “control” would 
seem to denote a capacity to effect change by engaging in or refraining 
from a certain activity with transboundary effects. This is not, 
however, the meaning assigned to “effective control” in the realm of 
human rights, where it is bound to a physical presence and the exercise 
of government functions. Based on this standard, it is unlikely that a 
state would be considered to have assumed effective control of foreign 
territory simply by virtue of its sharing resources with another. 
 
2. Personal Jurisdiction 
 
Another model for the extraterritorial application of human 
rights law, embraced by several UN treaty bodies,58 the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights,59 and the ECtHR,60 is based 
on control over persons rather than territory. Under this interpretation, 
jurisdiction is founded upon “the relationship between the individual 
and the State,” regardless of location.61 Authority over the individual 
might derive from nationality, a custodial or some other special 
relation, or an exercise of a legal power, though none of these criteria 
sufficiently captures the full range of cases that would intuitively be 
 
57 See, e.g. African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources, preamble (2003); General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX), Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States, art. 30 (Dec. 12, 1974), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3281(XXIX); UN Environment Programme, Draft Principles in the Field 
of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious 
Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, principle 3.1 (May 
19, 1978), U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.6/CRP.2; Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, principle 2 (Aug. 12, 1992), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26. 
58 Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R.12/52, UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 
(A/36/40), 
176 (1981); Committee Against Torture, para. 16 (Jan. 24, 2008), General 
Comment No. 2, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/2. 
59 Coard v. United States, Case No. 10.951, Report No. 109/99, para. 37; 
Saldaño v. Argentina, Report No. 38/99, paras. 15–20. 
60 Al-Skeini, supra note 56, at 137. 
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included.62 As Professor Marko Milanovic observes, personal 
jurisdiction tends to converge in practice with effective control as the 
physical unit of analysis contracts in size to, for instance, a single 
apartment building or detention facility.63 
 
While it is true that in some sense resource-sharing states 
“exercise[ ] control or authority over [ ] individual[s]” beyond their 
borders,64 it once again does not appear to be the type of control 
imagined in personal jurisdiction cases. In the jurisprudence of human 
rights tribunals adopting this reasoning as the basis for jurisdiction, 
there is always some form of direct and personalized contact between 
the foreign state and the victim, whether from the individual entering 
into state’s physical custody, becoming a target of a law enforcement 
action, serving as a member of its the armed forces, setting foot into 
embassy premises, or being subjected to a similar exercise of 
authority.65 The case law does not support the extraterritorial 
application of human rights law on a personal jurisdiction theory based 
on a capacity to alter resource endowments. 
 
3. Positive and Negative Rights 
 
 In human rights discourse, a distinction is commonly drawn 
between positive and negative rights. Negative rights may only be 
violated actively and are commonly associated with the ICCPR; 
positive rights may be violated passively and are primarily tabulated 
in the International Convention on Cultural, Economic, and Social 
Rights (“ICESCR”).66 Critiquing the effective control and personal 
jurisdiction models as vague to the point of serving no practical use, 
Milanovic’s preferred formulation instead differentiates in treatment 
between positive and negative human rights obligations. He argues 
that, whereas the protection and fulfillment of positive human rights 
may only be possible within regions of effective control, negative 
human rights may be respected anywhere.67 Milanovic defends this 
 
62 MILANOVIC, supra note 52, at 207-8.  
63 Id. at 127–35. 
64 Al-Skeini, supra note 56, at 137.  
65 MILANOVIC, supra note 52, at 187–207. 
66 David Jason Karp, What is the Responsibility to Respect Human Rights? 
Reconsidering the ‘Respect, Protect, and Fulfill Framework, 12 INT’L THEORY 83, 
88 (2020); Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1758, 1764 (2008). 










system as predictable, rational, and in line with the human rights ideals 
of universality and effectiveness.68  
 
Should Milanovic’s theory be adopted by human rights courts, 
it would likely require imposing extraterritorial human rights 
obligations upon states sharing natural resources. The first step in the 
analysis would be to determine whether the right in question is positive 
or negative. As Milanovic admits, this sorting is not always 
straightforward, in part because some rights have both positive and 
negative aspects.69 In Milanovic’s terms, these rights would therefore 
bear both territorial and extraterritorial obligations. Take the right to 
water, which is inferred from the general ICESCR rights to an 
adequate standard of living and to the highest attainable standard of 
health.70 According to the Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (“CESCR”), the right contains both “freedoms,” i.e. 
negative components, and “entitlements,” i.e. positive components.71 
Positive elements of the right to water include state obligations to 
promote realization of and prevent outside interference with the 
right.72 At the same time, states are themselves negatively bound by 
prohibitions against impairing the right to water, including in other 
states.73 A violation of this obligation, per the CESCR, includes the 
“diminution of water resources affecting human health”74—possibly 
by overuse of a shared water supply. 
 
By the same token, the rights to food, health, and life include 
an obligation that states refrain from conduct endangering their 
 
68 Id. at 119. 
69 MILANOVIC, supra note 52, at 222. 
70 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 
11–12, Dec. 16 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights]; Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, arts. 
11, 12, para. 3 (Jan. 20, 2003), General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, UN 
Doc. E/C.12/2002/11. 
71 Id. para. 10. 
72 See id paras. 23, 25–26; see also Rhett B. Larson, The New Right in 
Water, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2204–209 (2013) (describing the 
predominant approach to the right to water as a “provision right”). 
73 See Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, paras. 21, 31, 
supra note 70; see also What Price for the Priceless?: Implementing the 
Justiciability of the Right to Water, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1067, 1085–86 (2007) 
(describing India’s negative rights approach). 
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enjoyment domestically or abroad.75 The CESCR’s commentary on 
the right to adequate food explicitly notes the need to adopt rights-
oriented environmental policies “at both the national and international 
levels.”76 Likewise, the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) takes note 
of the threats to the rights to life posed by “[e]nvironmental 
degradation, climate change, and unsustainable development.”77 
Accordingly, it requires states to utilize natural resources sustainably 
and enter into consultations with other states over activities likely to 
significantly affect the environment.78 Collectively, this evidence 
supports Milanovic’s framework by requiring resource-sharing states 




 Finding Milanovic’s negative-positive model at times arbitrary 
and incomplete, Professor Yuval Shany instead puts forward a 
functionalist approach: “states should protect human rights wherever 
in the world they may operate, whenever they may reasonably do so.”79 
The limiting principle that Shany proposes for this context-informed 
understanding of jurisdiction is that “the potential impact of the act or 
omission in question [must be] direct, significant, and foreseeable.”80 
Thus, the failure to ameliorate hunger in a foreign state would not 
ordinarily be a human rights violation, but directly contributing to or 
 
75 Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 11, para. 15, 
36 (May 12, 1999), General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 
11), UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5; Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, art. 12, para. 33, 39 (Aug. 11, 2000), General Comment No. 14: The Right 
to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4; 
Human Rights Committee, art. 6, para. 7 (Sept. 3, 2019), General Comment No. 
36: Article 6: Right to Life, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36. 
76 Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 11, para. 4, 
supra note 75. 
77 Human Rights Committee, art. 6, para. 62, supra note 75. 
78 Id. 
79 See Yuval Shany, Taking Universality Seriously: A Functional 
Approach to Extraterritoriality in International Human Rights, 7 L. & ETHICS OF 
HUMAN RTS. 47, 67 (2013); see also Maria L. Banda, Regime Congruence: 
Rethinking the Scope of State Responsibility for Transboundary Environmental 
Harm, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1879, 1927–31 (2019) (positing a theory of 
extraterritorial application of human rights based on their “direct effects”). 
80 Id. at 68–9. See also Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial 
Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 9(b) 
(applying the scope of jurisdiction to “situations over which State acts or omissions 
bring about foreseeable effects on the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural 










perhaps even tolerating the causes of global hunger might be.81 
Conveying a concern for extending state human rights obligations too 
far, Shany rejects the notion of imposing upon states overly onerous 
duties, such as requiring them to send aid to foreign peoples or to halt 
pollution altogether. The state acts and omissions in these examples, 
writes Shany, are too causally attenuated from the harms.82 
 
A functionalist perspective presents the clearest path to 
imposing extraterritorial human rights duties upon states holding 
transboundary resources. In his own exposition, Shany concludes 
analogously that restricting the transnational supply of essential 
resources such as gas or electricity would constitute human rights 
violations.83 By virtue of geography, resource-sharing states are in a 
position to reasonably affect the human rights climate in other states. 
This would not mean that they could not exploit these resources for 
themselves, but only that they must not dramatically alter the available 
supply.  
 
B. International Criminal Law 
 
In addition to its human rights implications, the gross 
mismanagement of shared resources may raise the specter of 
international criminal liability. International law has for decades 
grappled with how to assign accountability for environmental harms. 
In preparing its Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, the ILC considered listing environmental damage as a crime 
against humanity.84 Numerous commentators have argued in favor of 
such a move85 and advocates have attempted unsuccessfully to prompt 
 
81 Yuval Shany, Taking Universality Seriously: A Functional Approach to 
Extraterritoriality in International Human Rights, 7 L. & ETHICS OF HUMAN RTS. 
47, 68–9 (2013). 
82 Id.; see also Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, para. 75 (Dec. 
12, 2001) (holding that liability based purely on causality is “tantamount to arguing 
that anyone adversely affected by any act imputable to a Contracting State, 
wherever in the world that act may have been committed or its consequences felt, is 
thereby brought within the jurisdiction of the State for the purpose of… [the 
European Convention on Human Rights]”). 
83 Shany, supra note 81, at 66–7. 
84 Christian Tomuschat, Document on Crimes Against the Environment, 2 
Y.B. OF THE INT’L L. COMM. 16, 18 (1996).  
85 See generally, e.g. Anastacia Greene, The Campaign to Make Ecocicde 
an International Crime: Quixotic Quest or Moral Imperative, 30 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
L. REV. 1 (2019); Caitlin Lambert, Environmental Destruction in Ecuador: Crimes 
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the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) to open investigations into 
instances of environmental degradation.86 In a policy paper published 
in 2016, the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor expressed interest in 
prosecuting crimes related to the exploitation of natural resources and 
the destruction of the environment.87 In furtherance of that initiative, 
it is possible that egregious abuses of shared natural resources could 
be punished under the Rome Statute as crimes against humanity or, 
albeit less likely, as genocide.  
 
1. Crimes against Humanity 
 
The crimes against humanity of forcible transfer of population 
and other inhumane acts are the closest matches to the harms 
perpetrated by expropriation of natural resources. In extreme cases, 
arguments might also be made for extermination and persecution. But 
whether any state official will be held criminally liable for these acts 
would likely depend on the application of the chapeau criteria for 
crimes against humanity. Specifically, the inquiry hinges on whether 
resource depletion can properly be considered an “attack” under 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute. 
 
i. Contextual Factors 
  
As defined in Article 7, a crime against humanity consists of 
the commission of any of a set of specified acts “as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack.”88 An “attack” in this 
context means “acts of violence,” though not necessarily via physical 
violence or armed force.89 Indeed, several different classes of crimes 
against humanity do not necessarily entail physical violence, such as 
 
Audrey Crasson, The Case of Chevron in Ecuador: The Need for an International 
Crime against the Environment?, 9 AMSTERDAM L. FORUM 29 (2017). 
86 Situation in Ecuador, Comm. (Oct. 2014). 
87 Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and 
Prioritisation, INT’L CRIM. CT. 3, 4 (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/itemsdocuments/20160915_otp-policy_case-selection_eng.pdf (para. 7). 
88 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(1), July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute 1998]. 
89 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1, Trial Judgement, 
para. 415 (Nov. 8, 1999); Elements of Crimes, INT’L CRIM. CT. 1, 5 (2011), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/336923d8-a6ad-40ec-ad7b-
45bf9de73d56/0/elementsofcrimeseng.pdf; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-










deportation, persecution, and apartheid. Courts have therefore broadly 
construed “attack” as meaning “any mistreatment of the civilian 
population”90 that “caus[es] physical or mental injury.”91 This may 
include “exerting pressure on the population to act in a particular 
manner.”92 
 
Action that drastically alters resource allocations might 
resemble other acts of deprivation that have been adjudged “attacks.” 
Charges of crimes against humanity have been brought before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) for the 
denial of access to food, water, medical care, shelter, and sanitation 
facilities to prisoners.93 Transboundary harms accomplished through a 
reduction in natural resources appear somewhat different from these 
cases because the affected population is not within the physical control 
or custody of the aggressor per se. But the statutory language and case 
law give little indication that such a distinction is necessarily relevant. 
Moreover, the crime against humanity of extermination is explicitly 
defined in the Rome Statute to include “the deprivation of access to 
food and medicine” under prescribed conditions.94 
 
To qualify as a crime against humanity, the “attack” must also 
be committed “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational 
policy.” The ICC has held that such a policy may be deduced from 
“repeated actions occurring according to the same sequence, or the 
existence of preparations or collective mobilization orchestrated and 
coordinated by the State or organization.”95 State decisions related to 
natural resource utilization would almost inevitably be formed on the 
basis of policy. However, the Rome Statute describes an attack not as 
a singular event, but as a “course of conduct” comprised of multiple 
 
90 Nahimana, Appeal Judgement, para. 916 (Nov. 28, 2007) (citing 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Appeal Judgement, para. 86 (June 
12, 2002)). 
91 Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39, Trial Judgement, para. 706 
(Mar. 1, 2002). 
92 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgement, para. 
581 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
93 Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Trial Judgement, para. 
54 (Nov. 29, 2002); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and 
Judgment, para. 707 (May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, 
Sentencing Judgement, para. 69 (Dec. 18, 2003). 
94 Rome Statute 1998, art. 7(2)(b), supra note 88. 
95 Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, para. 1109 (Mar. 7, 
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distinct acts.96 Courts have likewise generally understood crimes 
against humanity to refer to patterns of repeated violence, as opposed 
to isolated incidents,97 and have consequently required a nexus 
between each individual act and the broader attack.98 This approach 
has received no shortage of criticism, with many commentators 
preferring to focus on the magnitude of the harm caused rather than 
the quantity of discrete acts involved.99 Nonetheless, under the 
prevailing interpretation, the construction and filling of a dam like the 
GERD would not amount to an “attack” were it to be considered one 
continuous act. On the other hand, this “act” is unlike many others 
because it would take place over the course of years and conceptually 
could be subdivided into smaller acts corresponding to the various 
stages of construction and filling.  
 
If transboundary resource harms can be recognized as an 
“attack” at all, there is a good chance that they will satisfy the other 
contextual elements for crimes against humanity. The term 
“widespread” “connotes the large-scale nature of the attack and the 
number of targeted persons.”100 “Systematic” refers to planning and 
direction, and may be inferred when the attack is pursuant to a state 
policy.101 An attack is “directed against [the] civilian population” if 
noncombatants are the “primary object,” considering a number of 
 
96 Rome Statute 1998, art. 7(2)(a), supra note 98 (defining “attack directed 
against any civilian population” as “a course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of [qualifying] acts…”). 
97 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, para. 11 (Nov. 14, 1995) 
(Decision on the Form of the Indictment); Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-
2000-55A-T, Trial Judgement, para. 512 (Sept. 12, 2006); Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, 
Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, para. 215 (June 12, 2014) (Decision on the 
confirmation of charges.). 
98 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, para. 97–8 
(Mar. 31, 2010) (Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya.). 
99 Chile Eboe-Osuji, Crimes Against Humanity: Directing Attacks Against 
a Civilian Population, 2 AFR. J. L. STUD. 118, 120 (2008); Mohamed Elewa Badar, 
From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: Defining the Elements of 
Crimes against Humanity, 5 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 73, 106–07 (2004). 
100 Prosecutor v. Harun and Kushayb, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, para. 
62 (Apr. 27, 2007) (Decision on the Prosecution Application under Art. 58(7) of 
the Statute) (citing Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, 
Appeals Judgement, para. 94 (Dec. 17, 2004)). 
101 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Judgement, 
para. 98 (June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, para. 
396 (Sept. 30, 2008) (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges.); Prosecutor v. 










different factors.102 Essentially, civilians are the primary object of an 
attack when the population at large is intentionally targeted.103 As for 
the mens rea, the perpetrator must have knowledge of the attack and 
that his or her acts are a part of it.104 Anyone involved in something 
like a dam project would automatically have knowledge of the attack 
when the attack is the dam itself.  
 
ii. Substantive Offenses 
 
If able to clear the preliminary hurdles outlined above, an 
extreme appropriation of shared natural resources may amount to the 
crimes against humanity of forcible transfer of population, other 
inhumane acts, extermination, or persecution. Depending on the facts, 
the first three might reasonably be charged provided that the 
perpetrator acted with knowledge or intent, which may be inferred if 
the consequences were foreseeable.105 Because the environmental 
impacts of development projects are often disputed, however, it may 
be difficult to conclusively show that a responsible official was fully 
aware that it would result in death, displacement, or other severe harm. 
Attribution of mens rea might be made simpler when harms take more 
immediate effect, such as flooding occasioned by the filling of a dam, 
rather than those that are more gradual, such as environmental 
degradation or long-term over-utilization.  
 
As discussed in more detail below, the crime against humanity 
of persecution has a unique mens rea element that makes it unlikely to 
apply to the mismanagement of shared resources. With this exception, 
the remainder of this section will consider only the respective elements 
of actus reus. 
 
a. Forcible Transfer 
 
The loss of access to vital resources can force mass migration; 
some estimates suggest that as much as one-third of Egypt’s 
 
102 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 101, para. 91. 
103 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, para. 81 (Mar. 
31, 2010) (Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya.); 
Chile Eboe-Osuji, supra note 99, at 122–24.  
104 See Prosecutor v. Blakic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgement, para. 
247 (Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR095-
1-T, Trial Judgement, para. 133 (May 21, 1999). 
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population could be displaced by the GERD.106 In the aftermath of 
such an occurrence, a strong case could be made out for a charge of 
forcible transfer of population based on the jurisprudence of 
international tribunals.  
 
Importantly for this analysis, physical force is not required to 
commit the crime of forcible transfer. Instead, the impetus for 
displacement “may include threat of force or coercion, such as that 
caused by… duress… or by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment.”107 The ICTY has interpreted the crime to mean creating 
conditions such that flight becomes necessary for survival, leaving 
victims without a “genuine choice.”108 This may be accomplished by 
the imposition of “severe living conditions” that disturb the victims’ 
right to be able to remain in their homes and communities, including 
the deprivation of food and water.109 Removal of a civilian population 
through these or any other means is only permitted under international 
law for the protection of the population or when mandated by military 
necessity,110 neither of which would excuse the misuse of shared 
resources in ordinary circumstances. 
 
b. Other Inhumane Acts 
 
Disrupting the supply of natural resources could also be 
prosecuted as the catchall crime against humanity for “other inhumane 
acts of a similar character” to those explicitly enumerated in the Rome 
Statute.111 The ICTY has indicated that the deprivation of sustenance 
would meet this standard by regarding it as functionally commensurate 
with other crimes against humanity.112 Several different international 
 
106 David Hearst, How Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam Became Egypt’s 
Nakba, MIDDLE EAST EYE (Aug. 4, 2020), 
https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/egypts-nakba-ethiopia-dam-nile-sisi. 
107 Elements of Crimes, supra note 89, at 6 (Fn. 12). 
108 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgement, para. 530 
(Aug. 2, 2001). 
109 Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Appeals Judgement, 
para. 319 (Mar. 17, 2009) (citing Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, 
Trial Judgement, para. 729 (Sept. 27, 2006)). 
110 Prosecutor v. Nuon and Khieu, Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, 
Trial Judgement, para. 155 (Aug. 7, 2014). 
111 Rome Statute 1998, art. 7(1)(k), supra note 88.  
112 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16, Trial Judgement, para. 
631 (Jan. 14, 2000) (“Such an attack on property in fact constitutes a destruction of 
the livelihood of a certain population. This may have the same inhumane 










tribunals have likewise construed the failure to provide for adequate 
living conditions to detainees, including sufficient food and water, as 
an inhumane act.113 Again, these cases differ from transboundary harm 
to resources because of the custodial relationship, but there is no 
jurisprudential cause to believe that difference is legally salient. 
Moreover, the Rome Statute names “starvation of civilians as a method 
of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their 
survival” as a war crime in international armed conflicts,114 suggesting 




A perpetrator may be guilty of the crime against humanity of 
extermination if he or she kills one or more persons as part of a mass 
killing.115 To apply to natural resource depletion, this would require a 
factual showing that the allegedly criminal utilization caused the death 
of “a numerically significant part of the population concerned.”116 If 
this result does occur, extermination would be an appropriate charge 
in recognition of the colossal scale of the crime.117 Moreover, as noted 
above, the Rome Statute definition expressly lists “deprivation of 
access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction 
of part of a population” as one method of extermination.118 While the 
word “calculated” would seem to require some additional showing of 
scienter, under the Rome Statute intent may be imputed constructively 





Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-I, Indictment, para. 24.1 (Nov. 4, 1994) (charging the 
defendant with a crime against humanity for “participating in humane acts” 
including “providing inadequate food” and “providing living conditions failing to 
meet minimal basic standards”).  
113 Prosecutor v. Leite, Case No. 04a/2001, Judgement, para. 156–62 
(Dec. 7, 2002); Prosecutor v. Prlić, Case No. IT-04-74-T, Trial Judgement, vol. 3, 
para. 1059–67 (May 29, 2013); Prosecutor v. Nuon and Khieu, Case No. 002/19-
09-2007/ECCC/TC, Trial Judgement, para. 456–58 (Aug. 7, 2014). 
114 Rome Statute 1998, art. 8(2)(b)(xxv), supra note 88. 
115 Elements of Crimes, supra note 89, at 6. 
116 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgement, para. 502 
(Aug. 2, 2001); see also Elements of Crimes, supra note 89, at 5 (Fn. 7, 6). 
117 David Marcus, Famine Crimes in International Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 
245, 273 (2003). 
118 Rome Statute 1998, art. 7(2)(b), supra note 88. 






590    FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW   [Vol. XXXII 
 
Unlike other crimes against humanity, persecution is a crime 
of specific intent, involving the illegal deprivation of one or more 
fundamental rights on the basis of group identity.120 One of these 
protected identities is nationality, allowing for the possibility of 
charging state actors with persecution for acts that disproportionately 
harm citizens of another state. Not only must the perpetrator be aware 
of the discriminatory effects of his or her action, he or she “must 
consciously intend to discriminate,” with discriminatory intent serving 
as a significant, if not primary, motive.121 In the related context of 
genocide, specific intent may be discerned from “the general political 
doctrine which gave rise to the acts… or the repetition of destructive 
and discriminatory acts.”122 The element of intent probably makes 
persecution an inapt fit for resource malfeasance. Given the benefits 
of resource exploitation to the acting state’s own population, it seems 
unlikely that discrimination against other dependent populations 




The crime of genocide differs from crimes against humanity in 
several respects. First, it does not require that the subject acts be 
committed as part of an “attack,”123 eliminating the difficulties with 
defining abuses of shared resources as such. Like the crime against 
humanity of persecution, genocide is also a crime of specific intent, 
concerning only those acts which are “committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious 
group.”124 While the inclusion of nationality makes it possible that 
genocide would apply to resource utilizations that harm only foreign 
populations, it again seems unlikely that the primary motives for such 
policies would be genocidal rather than economical, especially in light 
of general recognition for the right to development.125 If they were, 
however, then state actors responsible for reducing the availability of 
 
120 Id. art. 7(2)(g); Elements of Crimes, supra note 89, at 10. 
121 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-07-25-T, Trial Judgement, para. 
435 (Mar. 15, 2002). 
122 Prosecutor v. Karadzić & Mladić, Case Nos. IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-
R61, Review of the Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, para. 94 (July 11, 1996). 
123 Rome Statute 1998, art. 6, supra note 88. 
124 Id. 
125 Peter Sharp, Prospects for Environmental Liability in the International 
Criminal Court, 18 VA. ENVT’L L. J. 217, 234 (1999); Rome Statute 1998, art. 6, 










resources in other states might be charged with genocide if it resulted 
in injuries including death or serious bodily or mental harm. 
 
C. The UN Charter and General Principles of International Law 
 
As the GERD has neared completion, sabers have been rattling 
in Egypt with increasing intensity,126 illustrating the risk of resource 
disputes escalating into armed conflict. In 2013, top Egyptian 
politicians were caught on tape discussing the possibilities of an 
airstrike on the dam or of arming Ethiopian rebel groups.127 In 2020, 
Egypt-based hackers launched a cyberattack on Ethiopian government 
websites.128 Not long after, Ethiopia banned flights over the GERD as 
a defensive precaution,129 with Donald Trump further stoking fears by 
suggesting that Egypt might “blow up” the dam.130  
 
While the UN Charter broadly forbids member states from 
threatening or actually using force against other states,131 it allows for 
a few exceptions. One is for action authorized by the Security 
Council,132 which has in fact issued numerous resolutions concerning 
access to resources during or following armed conflict.133 Another is 
Article 51 of the Charter, which grants states “the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence” against an “armed attack” 
 
126 Samy Magdy, Egyptian Media Urges Military Action against Ethiopia 
as Nile Talks Break Down, THE TIMES OF ISR. (Oct. 22, 2019, 2:13 PM), 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/egyptian-media-urges-military-action-against-
ethiopia-as-nile-talks-break-down/. 
127 Griff Witte, Egypt Sees Ethiopian Dam as Risk to Water Supply, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 18, 2013, 8:59 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/18/egypt-ethiopia-dam-blue-nile. 
128 Zecharias Zelalem, An Egyptian Cyber Attack on Ethiopia by Hackers 
Is the Latest Strike over the Grand Dam, QUARTZ (June 27, 2020), 
https://qz.com/africa/1874343/egypt-cyber-attack-on-ethiopia-is-strike-over-the-
grand-dam/. 
129 River Nile Row: Ethiopia Bans Flights above Grand Renaissance Dam, 
BBC (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
54416424#:~:text=Ethiopia's%20civil%20aviation%20authority%20has,crucial%2
0for%20its%20economic%20growth/. 
130 Farouk Chothia, Trump and Africa: How Ethiopia was ‘Betrayed’ over 
Nile Dam, BBC (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
54531747. 
131 Charter of the U. N., art. 2(4), June 26, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI. 
132 Id. art. 42. 
133 James D. Fry & Agnes Chong, UN Security Council Resolution of 
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launched by another state.134 If not rising to the level of an “armed 
attack,” aggrieved states might nonetheless respond to an unlawful use 
of force by appealing to the principle of necessity or by imposing 
countermeasures. 
 
1. Uses of Force 
 
The UN Charter obliges member states to refrain from “the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state.”135 While there is no authoritative 
definition for the “use of force,” purely political or economic coercion 
would not necessarily suffice.136 On the other hand, the force need not 
be physical or military in nature. Uses of force are instead 
distinguished from other hostile acts by their “scale and effects.”137 
The quantitative dimension of the force is thus weighted more strongly 
than its qualitative character. 
 
The advent of cybercrime has prompted a rethinking of “uses 
of force,” particularly those which do not take kinetic form. The 
Tallinn Manual, the leading treatise on the application of international 
law in cyberspace, promulgates a non-exhaustive set of criteria to 
determine when a cyber operation amounts to a use of force. Most 
important among them is the severity of the impact registered.138 Other 
factors include a) immediacy, b) causal directness, c) invasiveness, d) 
measurability of effects, e) military character, f) state involvement, and 
g) presumptive legality.139 According to the Tallinn Manual, any 
action that causes death, injury, or property damage automatically 
meets this test.140 
 
 
134 Charter of the U.N., art. 51, supra note 131. 
135 See id.; see also G. A., Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970). 
136 See INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE Rule 10 para. 10 (Michael 
N. Schmitt, ed. 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUEL] (observing that proposals to 
incorporate political and economic pressures into the definition of “force” have 
been considered and rejected). 
137 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. U.S.), Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 195 (June 27, 1986) 
[hereinafter Nicaragua]; TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 136, at Rule 11 para. 1. 
138 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 136, at Rule 11 para. 9. 
139 Id. 










The application of the Tallinn factors to misappropriations of 
transboundary resources depends upon the type of resource and the 
type of utilization, particularly with respect to the severity, immediacy, 
causation, and measurability. Downstream harms caused by the 
GERD, for instance, would seem to score highly on these metrics, 
whereas minor disturbances in the balance may not. In some sense, 
property damage is inflicted by the very fact of one state’s 
overconsumption of a common resource. Certainly, human harms may 




Some states, including the United States, maintain that there is 
no difference between an Article 2(4) “use of force” and an Article 51 
“armed attack.”141 The majority view, however, is that these terms 
differ in degree. The most authoritative judicial guidance remains the 
ICJ’s 1986 judgement in Nicaragua v. US, where it construed “armed 
attack” as meant to signify “the most grave forms of the use of 
force.”142  
 
Notwithstanding the canon of construction that a treaty term is 
to be interpreted “in accordance with [its] ordinary meaning,”143 an 
“armed attack,” like a “use of force,” is generally treated as a gravity 
threshold rather than as literally requiring the use of military means 
and methods.144 In its advisory opinion on the use of nuclear weapons, 
the ICJ pronounced that Article 51 applies to “any use of force, 
 
141 Michael Schmitt, Top Expert Backgrounder: Aborted U.S. Strike, 
Cyber Operation against Iran, and International Law, JUST SECURITY (June 24, 
2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64669/top-expert-backgrounder-on-aborted-u-
s-strike-and-cyber-operation-against-iran-and-international-law/. 
142 Nicaragua, supra note 137; see also Case Concerning Oil Platforms 
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgement, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 
para. 51 (Nov. 6). 
143 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
144 José Luis Aragón Cardiel, Amanda Davis, & Lauranne Macherel, 
Modern Self-Defense: The Use of Force Against Non-Military Threats, 49 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 99, 114 (2018); Claire Wright, Blueprinte for Survival: A New 
Praadigm for International Environmental Emergences, 29 FORDHAM ENVT’L L. 
REV. 221, 296–97 (2017); Scott J. Shackelford and Richard B. Andres, State 
Responsibility for Cyber Attacks: Competing Standards for a Growing Problem, 42 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 971, 996–98 (2011); Office of General Counsel, An Assessment of 
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regardless of the weapons employed.”145 By this view, any act causing 
significant loss of life or property damage may constitute an “armed 
attack.”146 The expert drafters of the Tallinn Manual also considered 
severe damage to critical infrastructure to qualify.147 In addition to its 
human costs, severe depletion of a vital resource might be akin to 
disabling critical infrastructure. 
 
Textual strictures once again notwithstanding,148 the notion of 
anticipatory self-defense is widely accepted today, even though Article 
51 seemingly applies only to armed attacks which have already 
occurred. According to the approach favored by the Tallinn Manual, 
this doctrine permits states to respond in self-defense to an imminent 
armed attack at the “last feasible window of opportunity.”149 This 
standard is not strictly temporal, but rather a contextual evaluation of 
the state’s ability to effectively defend itself. In the case of the GERD, 
Egypt’s right to anticipatory self-defense might begin at a moment 
when negotiations had failed and Ethiopia was preparing to fill the dam 





Even if it is not registered as an “armed attack,” a state 
enduring a loss of natural resources owing to a neighbor’s wrongdoing 
would not be without options. It might invoke the principle of 
necessity, which entitles aggrieved states to commit otherwise 
wrongful acts as a last resort in order to “safeguard an essential interest 
against a grave and imminent peril,” provided that in doing so they do 
not impair the essential interests of other states.150 While the term is 
intended to apply only to “exceptional cases,”151 presumably 
 
145 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, para. 39 (July 8). 
146 Karl Zemanek, Armed Attack, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Pub. Int’l 
L., para. 21 (Oct. 2013). 
147 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 136, at Rule 13 para. 16. 
148 Charter of the U.N., art. 2(4), supra note 131 (in which the right to self-
defense is triggered only “if an armed attack occurs”). 
149 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 136, at Rule 15 para. 4. 
150 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 25, 
G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002). 
151 INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION [ILC], DRAFT ARTICLES ON 
RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, WITH 










impending environmental harms would meet that high threshold. 
Moreover, the ICJ has held that the perilous effects are considered 
imminent once the causes are in motion, even if there is a gap in time 
or if the extent of the coming harm has not been clearly established.152 
 
A plea of necessity thus bears some resemblance to the 
meaning of self-defense under customary international law, in which 
it is treated as an inherent right even in the absence of an armed 
attack.153 The Caroline incident, which is frequently referred to as the 
foundation for this view, was in fact treated at the time as a case of 
necessity rather than self-defense.154 However, it is not clear that the 
modern understanding of necessity would abide a use of force;155 
indeed, the customary interpretation of self-defense is today the 
minority position.156 Furthermore, necessity may only excuse action 
that does not impair the essential interest of another state. Even if 
abused, the sovereign rights to development and to the utilization of 
natural resources are likely essential interests that might be harmed by 




Countermeasures present another potential response to the 
misuse of shared natural resources. They allow an injured state to 
breach its international obligations respecting a state which has 
committed an internationally wrongful act in order to induce a return 
to compliance.157 But a number of restrictions on the usage of 
countermeasures diminish their practicality in the context of resource 
disputes. For one, countermeasures, unlike self-defense, may not be 
invoked prospectively; they may only be implemented in response to 
 
152 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 
paras. 51, 54 (Sept. 25, 1997). 
153 Charles Pierson, Preemptive Self-Defense in an Age of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 150, 
156–59 (2020). 
154 RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES, supra note 151, at 81. 
155 Id. at 84; TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 136, at Rule 9 para. 10. 
156 Charles Pierson, Preemptive Self-Defense in an Age of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 150, 
156–59 (2020). 
157 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 49, 
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an ongoing violation.158 They also must be proportional, non-
escalatory, and generally reversible.159 Countermeasures may not 
include the threat or actual use of force and they must cease when the 
responsible state restores compliance.160 Countermeasures may be a 
particularly ineffectual option for smaller states with limited means to 
apply political or economic pressure against wrongdoers even if 
restrictively licensed to flout international obligations.161 
 
III. SHARED RESOURCES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 
 
 Examining shared natural resources through the lenses of 
international human rights law, international criminal law, and the UN 
Charter promotes the development of the law in two distinct ways. 
First, it can provide guidance to the adjudication of natural resource 
disputes by adding content to the blurry ERU and NSH concepts. At 
the least, it would seem that a utilization could hardly be considered 
“equitable and reasonable” if it violated an international duty. The fact 
of such a violation might also bear on the “significance” of the harm 
inflicted. 
  
Second, the application of international human rights law, 
international criminal law, and the law of use of force to cases of 
competition over shared resources should prompt further 
reconsideration of the limitations of the classical forms of each of these 
bodies of law and their capacity to accommodate nontraditional threat 
vectors. To a certain extent, all have already begun to adapt to an era 
in which states face dangers that materialize outside of their 
jurisdictions. With global warming likely to intensify competition over 
resources, the urgency of this evolution is continually ascending. 
 




158 Michael N. Schmitt, Below the Threshold Cyber Operations: The 
Countermeasures Response Option and International Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 697, 
715 (2014). 
159 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 49, 
supra note 150; Michael N. Schmitt, supra note 157, at 715;Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 87 (Sept. 25). 
160 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, arts. 50, 53, 
supra note 150. 
161 Sheng Li, When Does Internet Denial Trigger the Right of Armed Self-










 A recognition of the consequences of competition over 
transboundary resources for international human rights law, 
international criminal law, and the UN Charter can lead to a fuller 
apprehension of the “equitable and reasonable” standard. While 
reasonableness is not synonymous with legality, unlawful conduct is 
unquestionably unreasonable.162 Thus, resource utilizations that 
violate other international obligations would presumptively not be 
found “equitable and reasonable” and may cause “significant harm.”  
 
 A multidisciplinary legal analysis that places the ERU and 
NSH principles in the context of broader international law can 
therefore assist in the evaluation of a given utilization of a shared 
resource. The violation of a human rights norm or a criminal statute 
should be accounted for in any assessment grounded in international 
environmental law. In particular, shared resource utilization policies 
should be appraised based on their impacts on the rights to food, water, 
health, and life and the international criminal exposure of acting 
officials. Similarly, the Tallinn factors can provide guidance as to 
when a certain resource utilization amounts to an unlawful use of 
force, supplying further evidence as to its reasonableness. When a 
resource-sharing state does breach an international norm, affected 
states may consider the proportional responses available to them 
through self-defense, necessity, or countermeasures. 
 
Reading the ERU and NSH principles alongside other bodies 
of international law is also justified as a juridical matter. The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties instructs that international 
agreements are to be interpreted in light of “any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”163 
For shared natural resources, this exercise is facilitated by the mutual 
compatibility of the relevant legal regimes.164 Consideration of rules 
protecting civilian populations is also in keeping with the purpose of 
treaties governing shared natural resources, which commonly place 
human needs at their center.165  
 
162 OLIVER CORTEN, REASONABLENESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, IN MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. para. 17 (2013). 
163 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
164 Maria L. Banda, Regime Congruence: Rethinking the Scope of State 
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1944 (2019). 
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B. Development of Other Areas of Law 
 
Despite its potentially monumental consequences for each, the 
misuse of shared natural resources pushes the prescriptive limits of 
international human rights law, international criminal law, and the UN 
Charter. In doing so, it underscores the need for further legal 
development across three different issue areas. First, it should further 
spur the evolution and progression of theories of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in human rights and criminal law. Second, transboundary 
resources stand as vivid examples of how the human rights objectives 
of one state can be at the expense of human rights in another state, 
necessitating a means of reconciliation. Third, appreciation of this 
class of transboundary harm begs further elucidation as to the forms of 
non-kinetic action that may be considered “attacks” under the Rome 
Statute and “uses of force” under the UN Charter. 
 
1. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
 
Shared natural resources test the jurisdictional boundaries of 
international human rights law and international criminal law. As 
described above, the jurisdictional models based on spatial and 
personal control favored by human rights tribunals are a poor fit for 
transboundary harms. This realization should provide further support 
for the movement to abandon these antiquated paradigms in exchange 
for a more flexible framework. In international criminal law, the 
expansion of universal jurisdiction and recent extraterritorial 
applications of the Rome Statute present paths to criminalizing 
transboundary harms.  
 
i. Human Rights: Functionalism Bounded by Causal and 
Quantitative Limits 
 
The alternative jurisdiction approaches put forward by 
Milanovic and Shany both mark potential new directions that would 
better capacitate human rights law to address transboundary harms. 
Under Milanovic’s negative rights theory, resource-sharing states 
would be obligated to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of 
 
on the Law of the Sea, art. 146, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (“the protection 
of human life”); Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as 











human rights extraterritorially. And according to Shany’s 
functionalism, states would be obligated to avert human rights 
violations of all types to the extent that they are capable. But both of 
these frameworks are in want of a limiting principle—how far must 
states go in advancing human rights beyond their borders? In a 
globalized world, domestic policymaking frequently has international 
human rights consequences, especially on environmental issues. Some 
standard is required to distinguish permissible resource utilizations 
with tolerable transboundary effects from other resource utilizations 
that unlawfully imperil human rights in neighboring states. 
 
Shany proposes drawing the line on extraterritorial human 
rights responsibilities at harms that are “direct, significant, and 
foreseeable.”166 Fittingly, this equation incorporates both causal and 
quantitative variables and employs terms that are well-defined in 
international law. Accounting for the quantum of harm in this context 
is appropriate because in both treaty and customary law regarding 
transboundary environmental harms, sic utere tolerates a minimum 
threshold of damage.167 As noted above, “significant” harms may be 
less severe than “serious” or “substantial” harms.168 
 
Causal attribution in international law is context-dependent 
and may vary according to the purpose of the rule that has been 
breached and the intention of the offending state.169 “Direct” is often 
associated with factual causality, for which international tribunals 
commonly apply a but-for test.170 That is, the cause must be necessary 
for the effect. “Foreseeability” instead refers to legal causality and is 
linked to the proximity or remoteness of harm.171 It is evaluated based 
on what was known to the actor at the time of the conduct.172 Taken 
 
166 Yuval Shany, Taking Universality Seriously: A Functional Approach to 
Extraterritoriality in International Human Rights, 7 L. & ETHICS OF HUMAN RTS. 
47, 68–9 (2013). 
167 Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 
DUKE L. J. 931, 952 (1997). 
168 Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, 
with Commentaries, 30, 60th Sess. (2008). 
169 Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, art. 31, cmt. 10, 53rd Sess. 
(2001) 
170 Martin Jarrett, Causation in International Investment Law, JUS MUNDI 
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together, “direct, significant, and foreseeable” serves as a logical and 
workable scheme that would allow international human rights law to 
address transboundary harms without imposing undue burdens upon 
states. 
 
ii. Criminal Law: Universal Jurisdiction and the Rome 
Statute 
 
The possibility that the gross misuse of transboundary 
resources could amount to an international crime also challenges the 
reach of international criminal law. Traditionally, international law 
recognizes criminal jurisdiction based on territory, nationality, or some 
other tie to the state.173 However, numerous international treaties make 
special jurisdictional allowances for offenses with which the state may 
have no relation. These include crimes such as genocide,174 war 
crimes,175 and torture176 which are considered so grave as to offend all 
of humanity, rendering the perpetrators hostes humani generis. It also 
includes crimes that are transnational in nature and contravene the law 
of nations (delicta juris gentium), such as piracy,177 terrorism,178 
 
173 Charles Chernor Jalloh, A Proposal for the International Law 
Commission to Study Universal Criminal Jurisdiction, 2018 AFR. J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 51, 52 (2018). 
174 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, art. 6–7, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
175 First Additional Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Convention, art. 85, June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 ; First Geneva Convention, art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 31 ; Second Geneva Convention, art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; 
Third Geneva Convention, art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Fourth 
Geneva Convention, art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
176 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, art. 5–7, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
177 Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, art. 4 
(Jan. 29, 2009), 
https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/DCoC%
20English.pdf. 
178 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 
art. 6–7, Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256; International Convention for the 











hostage-taking,179 currency counterfeiting,180 drug trafficking,181 and 
airplane hijacking.182 These conventions generally require member 
states to investigate and either prosecute or extradite culprits that may 
be present within their jurisdiction, even if they otherwise have no 
connection to the crime.  
 
Despite its transboundary implications, no treaty imposes 
similar obligations upon states to punish crimes against the natural 
environment as delicta juris gentium. However, many states have 
embraced the principle of universal jurisdiction in their domestic law, 
enabling them to prosecute international crimes under domestic law 
without a jurisdictional hook.183 At the international level, the ICC 
implicitly recognized that crimes against humanity may be committed 
transnationally in its 2019 authorization of an investigation into the 
situation in Bangladesh and Myanmar. In that decision, the Court held 
that it may take jurisdiction when any part of the criminal conduct 
occurs within the territory of a state party.184 This ruling lays the 
groundwork for future extraterritorial applications of the Rome 
Statute, such as for crimes against humanity occasioned by resource 
deprivation. 
 
2. Conflict of Human Rights 
 
Interstate competition over shared natural resources may bring 
human rights into conflict. For example, the fulfillment of the right to 
development in one state by exploitation of a transboundary resource 
may obstruct the rights to food, water, and other related rights in 
another state. International human rights law does not stipulate a clear 
method for resolving this tension, which undermines its aspirations to 
 
179 Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, art. 5, Dec. 17, 1979, 
1316 U.N.T.S. 206. 
180 International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting 
Currency, art. 17, Apr. 20, 1929, 112 League of Nations Treaty Series 371. 
181 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, art. 4, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95. 
182 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 
art. 4, 1971, 860 U.N.T.S. 105. 
183 Jalloh, supra note 172, at 51-52. 
184 Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the 
Union of Myanmar, Case No. ICC-01/19, paras. 46–62 (Nov. 14, 2019), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_06955.PDF (Decision Pursuant to 
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the universality and mutual compatibility of rights.185 Rather, 
practitioners are left to construct ad hoc standards based on a balancing 
of the interests.186 
 
The German Constitutional Court has innovated a model for 
reaching compromise in these situations called “practical 
concordance.” It entails a weighing of several different factors: a) the 
impact or degree of harm to the right, b) the centrality of the harm to 
the interests protected by the right, c) the involvement of additional 
rights, d) the effect on a general interest bearing on human rights, e) 
the alignment of the invocation of the right with the right’s intended 
purpose, and f) the objective fairness of the manner in which the right 
has been exercised.187 The relative importance of these factors depends 
on the context. 
 
Another means of resolving rights conflicts would be to 
differentiate between the distinct responsibilities to respect, protect, 
and fulfill human rights. The responsibility to respect is the state’s 
obligation to “refrain from interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment 
of human rights;” protection of human rights requires the state to 
defend against abuses committed by third parties; to fulfill human 
rights the state “must take positive action to facilitate the[ir] 
enjoyment.”188 This tripartite framework is not enshrined in treaty law; 
in fact, many human rights treaties do not explicitly mention an 
obligation to respect at all.189 However, it has been widely referenced 
by the CESCR and represents the standard modern understanding.190 
 
The notions of respect, protection, and fulfillment of human 
rights were conceived by the UN in order to remedy the “false 
 
185 Peter G. Danchin, Of Prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion 
and the Conflict of Rights in International Law, 49 HARV. INT’L L. J. 249, 277 
(2008). 
186 Nicolas A.J. Croquet, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Innovative 
Human Rights Framework: Between Enhanced Legislative Codification and 
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187 Stijn Smet, Freedom of Expression and the Right to Reputation: 
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188 The Foundation of International Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS 
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rights-law. 
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dichotomy” between negative and positive rights.191 The different 
duties instead exist on a spectrum between negative and positive 
obligations, with respect primarily demanding restraint and fulfillment 
mandating remedial action.192 Recalling Milanovic’s insight that, from 
a functionalist perspective, it is easier for states to ensure negative 
rights,193 it is therefore also true that it is usually easier for states to 
respect human rights than to protect or fulfill them.  
 
Not only are states better-positioned to respect human rights as 
a practical matter, but their duty to respect may be stronger than the 
duties to protect or fulfill. The concept of respect for human rights as 
a distinct imperative originates in a libertarian impulse to minimize 
state meddling in the private sphere.194 Political predilections toward 
this laissez-faire ideology among powerful states have led to the 
elevation of the duty to respect above the duties to protect and fulfill.195 
When rights are in conflict, obligations stemming from the duty to 
respect might therefore weigh heavier than those arising from the 
responsibilities to protect and fulfill. Thus, a duty not to cause 
environmental harm might overpower a conflicting duty to promote 
economic development.  
 
3. Non-Kinetic Force 
 
Lastly, an appreciation for the damage that may be inflicted by 
the misappropriation of shared natural resources should further 
stimulate debate over how international criminal law and the UN 
Charter regulate non-kinetic action. In particular, the term “attack” as 
employed by the Rome Statute in the definition of crimes against 
humanity and the terms “use of force” and “armed attack” in Articles 
2 and 51 of the UN Charter have undergone an evolution in meaning 
in response to developments in the modern threat frontier. Many of the 
most menacing risks today—from climate change to cyber warfare to 
disease—are not strictly military or physical. Deciding when these 
perils will be considered “attacks” or “uses of force” under 
international law will be a critical and ongoing project for the 
international community in the decades to come. The benchmarks set 
 
191 Id. at 84. 
192 Id. at 89. 
193 MILANOVIC, supra note 52, at 219. 
194 Karp, supra note 66, at 89. 
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The mismanagement of shared natural resources may have 
acute consequences for international human rights law, international 
criminal law, and the UN Charter’s provisions on the use of force. 
Depending on the operative theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction, it 
may threaten the rights to food, water, health, and life. In extreme 
cases, it may amount to a crime against humanity. And it may be an 
illegal use of force potentially justifying responsive action by 
aggrieved states. Apprehension of these legal implications in realms 
beyond environmental law can assist in the determination of which 
utilizations ought to be considered “equitable and reasonable.” 
Moreover, the risk of transboundary harm caused by the short-sighted 
or cynical expropriation of shared resources calls for juridical reforms 






























2021]      SHARED NATURAL RESOURCES AND HUMAN RIGHTS       605 
 
605 
 
 
 
